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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world without bulky desk-top computers,
without the constant struggle to keep software up to date,
and without overworked corporate IT departments struggling
to keep systems minimally functional; this vision was given to
the public when cloud computing first became a possibility.
Cloud computing presents a potential paradigm shift for all
sectors of society. Why then, have these technologies not
taken the world by storm?
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Santa Clara University School of Law.
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Despite the numerous technical benefits of cloud
computing, consumers must consider the significant question
of what legal rights and responsibilities these new
technologies trigger. As with most new technologies, the
applicability of existing laws, the possibility of new laws
tailored specifically to the new technology, and the specter of
future regulatory action, all remain unclear. Although the
modern world is truly a global economy, and cloud computing
touches virtually every corner of the globe, this Comment will
focus on the differences between United States and European
Union law to illuminate the difficulties facing the market for
cloud computing.
These legal uncertainties pose significant risks to cloud
service providers and consumers alike. Service providers’
management structures are forced to balance the reward of
investing in new technologies with the risks posed by
lawsuits under existing laws and the distinct possibility that
their firm will be exposed to significant new and
unforeseeable liabilities under future laws and regulations.
Large companies looking to utilize these new services must
rely mostly on skilled contract writing, rather than clear
industry or government enforced standards, to protect their
rights and liabilities. Individuals and smaller companies, on
the other hand, are essentially unable to negotiate and are
thus subject to adhesion contracts with whatever terms the
various service providers happen to include.
This Comment will demonstrate that the uncertainty
caused by ambiguous enforcement of existing laws, a lack of
clearly applicable regulations, and inconsistent industry
standards regarding privacy and security concerns, result in a
high degree of risk for the cloud computing industry. This
uncertainty, in turn, suppresses both supply and demand. In
order to establish the existence of uncertainty and the
problems therein, I will discuss the applicable economic
theory, 1 define cloud computing, 2 discuss the societal
importance of the technology and law, 3 identify political
players, 4 outline the applicable laws and regulations and

1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.C.
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compare them on a broad level to European Union Law, 5
discuss industry standards and contracts, 6 and provide
recommendations for future U.S. law regarding cloud
computing. 7
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Economic Theory
A large portion of economic theory focuses on the function
of efficient markets and the allocation of goods. 8 Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto developed the traditional definition
of economic efficiency: a market or allocation of goods is
“efficient if there is no other allocation which makes no one
worse off while making some agents strictly better off.” 9 The
balancing that takes place in the context of this Comment is
between producers and consumers. Producers’ options are
determined by the “sum of the values of the inputs minus the
sum of the values of the outputs,” and consumers allocate
their resources such that “the present net worth of a
consumer is the total value of his resources plus the total
value of his shares of the present values of producers’
production plans.” 10 As such, there is a problem resulting
from market participants’ inability to accurately assess the
present value of their goods (a problem of uncertainty). 11
These issues, due to regulatory and legal flux, exist in various
industries. 12
5. See infra Part I.D.
6. See infra Part I.E.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. One conception of economics is that it is the study of the allocation of
scarce resources. The focus of academic thought is thus, generally, how to
efficiently distribute those resources to maximize utility. See, e.g., Herbert A.
Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1,
1 (1978).
9. Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, Bayesian Implementation, in
53 FUNDAMENTALS OF PURE AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 13 (A. Postlewaite ed.,
1993).
10. Roy Radner, Problems in the Theory of Markets under Uncertainty, 60
AM. ECON. REV. 454, 455 (1970).
11. See Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok, & Theodore Sougiannis, The
Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. FIN.
2431, 2454 (2001) (“[T]he lack of accounting information on such an important
intangible asset [R&D expenditure and expected value] may impose real costs
on investors through increased volatility.”).
12. See id.
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While the actual market strategies of current players in
the cloud computing industry are impossible to ascertain from
the outside, uncertainty does have a common impact in other
In the electricity industry, for instance,
industries. 13
companies were found to reduce investment when the
relevant legislators exhibited a lack of coherent direction on
the regulatory front. 14 The analogy is clear: industries forced
to balance risks and rewards attributable to regulatory
unpredictability are expected to react in a similar fashion. 15
While there are no industries where a direct comparison can
be made, an unexpected regulatory change in the nuclear
power industry caused nuclear power providers to lose as
much as ninety percent of their profits. 16 This possibility of a
drastic shift as a result of changing regulatory schemes leaves
the budding cloud computing industry in a state of
inefficiency.
Essentially, firms pay close attention to the laws and
regulations affecting the sustainability of their business
model, and “when firms perceive that new regulatory
initiatives are unstable, specific investments appear more
risky.” 17 This theory was borne out in the electricity industry
where a new act increased investment significantly in states
with little to no history of regulatory reversals, and had no
statistically significant effect in states with a history of
repealing regulatory acts. 18 In sum, when it comes to sunk
costs 19 or transaction specific investments, “uncertainty is
widely conceded to be a critical attribute.” 20
13. See id.
14. Kira R. Fabrizio, The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment:
Evidence from the Renewable Energy Generation 1 (The Wharton Sch., 11th
Annual Strategy and the Business Environment Conference, 2011), available at
http://wwwmanagement.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/msbe/2011/4_2_Fabrizio.pdf.
15. Id.
16. See Arie Kapteyn, Nicholas Kieffer & John Rust, Introduction The
Microeconometrics of Dynamic Decision Making, Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 10 J APPLIED ECONOMETRICS S1, S5 (1995).
17. Fabrizio, supra note 14, at 2.
18. See id. at 3.
19. Sunk Cost Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE,
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sunk%20cost (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012) (defining sunk cost as “a cost already incurred that is not
subject to variation or revision”).
20. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 239 (1979).
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This bears relevance to cloud computing in that any
investment down a particular chain of technology or security
software development is a sunk cost of operation. Unable to
predict which specifications compliance with possible
regulatory systems will entail, companies will simply not
invest in any more technology than is necessary to remain
competitive. In addition, in the modern legal climate, the cost
of litigating lawsuits is significant for both service providers
and the direct consumers.
Moreover, these costs are
unpredictable.
B. Technology
To understand the root of the issues, it is important to
first be clear about what cloud computing actually entails. 21
Cloud computing has antecedents as early as the 1950s, when
AT&T designed and developed centralized data storage
systems for businesses. 22 Today, cloud computing has evolved
to encompass a variety of information technology solutions. 23
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is the
government body responsible for, among other things,
establishing “assessment criteria and test data sets for
validation of industrial products” in the information
technology space. 24 The policy directive of this organization is
to “foster cloud computing systems and practices that support
interoperability, portability, and security.” 25 In an attempt to
provide a broad working definition, the NIST defines cloud
computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient,
on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources . . . that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction.” 26
21. This overview of the technology involved in cloud computing, while by no
means exhaustive, should be sufficient to anticipate and understand many of
the issues facing the industry.
22. See A Complete History of Cloud Computing, SALESFORCE,
http://www.salesforce.com/uk/socialsuccess/cloud-computing/the-completehistory-of-cloud-computing.jsp (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
23. See NIST Cloud Computing Program, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH.(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/index.cfm.
24. What ITL Does, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.nist.gov/itl/what-itl-does.cfm.
25. NIST Cloud Computing Program, supra note 23.
26. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD
COMPUTING 2 (Sept. 2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
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The definition proceeds to list five essential
characteristics of cloud computing: on-demand self-service,
broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and
measured service. 27 Self-service essentially provides “ability
to upload, build, deploy, schedule, manage, and report . . . on
demand.” 28 Broad network access is defined as a system
where “capabilities are available over the network and
accessed through standard mechanisms.” 29 Resource pooling
entails “a standardized, scalable, and secure physical
infrastructure” 30 that is used to serve multiple customers. 31
Rapid elasticity is simply the on-demand rapidly scalable
nature of the pooled resources. 32 Finally, these systems
employ measured service, meaning that there is “a metering
capability which enables [parties] to control and optimize
resource use.” 33
The five characteristics of cloud computing manifest into
several broad categories of services offered: Software as a
Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and
Platform as a Service (PaaS). 34 SaaS providers install and
run software on their servers which are accessed remotely by
The most common SaaS services are
customers. 35
Salesforce.com’s online management tools. 36 IaaS services,
such as Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud, 37 offer flexibility
and scalability by furnishing customers with access to virtual
servers where the customer then installs and maintains their
nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Dave Malcolm Surgient, The Five Defining Characteristics of Cloud
Computing| ZDNet, VIRTULIZATION (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.zdnet.com/
news/the-five-defining-characteristics-of-cloud-computing/287001.
29. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 26, at 2.
30. Surgient, supra note 28.
31. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 26, at 2.
32. Rapid Elasticity, CLOUD BASED COMPUTING (Sept. 19, 2010),
http://cloudglossary.com/home/id.Rapid-Elasticity/i.html.
33. Essential Characteristics of Cloud Computing, ISACA, http://
www.isaca.org/Groups/Professional-English/cloud-computing/GroupDocuments/
Essential%20characteristics%20of%20Cloud%20Computing.pdf.
34. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 26, at 2.
35. Id.
36. See Ania Monaco, A View Inside the Cloud, THE INSTITUTE (June 7,
2012),
http://theinstitute.ieee.org/technology-focus/technology-topic/a-viewinside-the-cloud.
37. Amazon EC2, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, aws.amazon.com/ec2 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2014).
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own software. 38 Finally, PaaS options such as the Google App
Engine have aspects of both of the preceding branches in that
they use an entire platform hosted on the provider’s server,
often including everything from an operating system to
developer tools. 39
These service models are then divided into three broad
types of implementation. 40 Public cloud services have no local
infrastructure, and are shared among multiple customers. 41
Private clouds entail an infrastructure used by a single
organization that can be owned or managed either by that
organization or a third party. 42 Hybrid clouds are, as the
name suggests, a combination of the above and characterized
by “standardized or proprietary technology that enables data
and application portability.” 43
C. The Political Players
Due to the vast amount of money involved and the
growing importance of the technology, 44 the United States
government has no choice but to take notice of the cloud
computing industry. 45 The Congressional Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet is the
primary entity responsible for regulations regarding Internetbased technologies. 46 This committee only recently began
38. See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 26, at 3.
39. See id. at 2–3.
40. See id. at 3.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Joe McKendrick, Cloud Computing Market Hot, but How Hot?
Estimates
are
All
Over
the
Map,
FORBES
(Feb.
13,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2012/02/13/cloud-computing-markethot-but-how-hot-estimates-are-all-over-the-map/.
45. See generally Cloud Computing: An Overview of the Technology and the
Issues Facing American Innovators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, 112th Cong. 112–122 (2012)
[hereinafter Cloud Computing Hearing]. Acknowledging both the committee’s
lack of knowledge and the importance of this burgeoning industry, the ranking
member of the subcommittee quipped that the hearing “is an important hearing
about things in the cloud, which some people say that is where I always am. So
I want to figure out what is going on up there.” Id. at 2 (statement of Rep.
Melvin L. Watt, ranking member, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet).
46. See Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the
Internet, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. JUDICIARY COMM., http://judiciary.house.gov/
index.cfm/subcommittee-on-courts-intellectual-property-and-the-internet (last

RYAN FINAL

504

5/23/2014 12:47 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

discussing the future of cloud computing in earnest. 47 Prior
to this hearing, and continuing for the time being, the laws
and regulations regarding cloud computing are mostly
handled by whichever agency regulates the particular
industry sector purchasing the cloud service. 48 This means
that privacy law comes in various parts from the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 49 the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (specifically the Stored Communications Act), 50
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 51
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 52rather than from a
centralized regulation governing cloud computing itself. 53
Although, to date, only that particular subcommittee has
shown significant interest, the amount of money involved
suggests that other governmental agencies such as the FCC
or FTC may show more interest in the future. 54 Piecemeal
regulatory action leaves the political players unable to realize
their policy goals and companies subject to illogical and
unpredictable policies meant for other industries and
technologies.
States in the European Union, on the other hand, tend to
have non-cloud specific but otherwise comprehensive plans in
place that correspond to the E.U. Data Protection Directive. 55
Only as recently as the summer of 2012, however, have E.U.
officials clarified their plans for specific cloud computing
regulations (still significantly ahead of the Congressional
visited Feb. 28, 2014).
“The Subcommittee on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet shall have jurisdiction over the following subject
matters: copyright, patent, trademark law, information technology, antitrust
matters, other appropriate matters as referred by the Chairman, and relevant
oversight.” Id. (emphasis added).
47. This hearing was held on July 25, 2012. Cloud Computing Hearing,
supra note 45.
48. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, BSA GLOBAL CLOUD COMPUTING SCORE
CARD 12 (2012), available at http://portal.bsa.org/cloudscorecard2012/
assets/PDFs/BSA_GlobalCloudScorecard.pdf.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
51. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
53. BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, COUNTRY REPORT: UNITED STATES 1 (Feb.
22, 2012), available at http://portal.bsa.org/cloudscorecard2012/assets/pdfs/
country_reports/Country_Report_US.pdf.
54. See McKendrick, supra note 44.
55. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 48, at 13–15.
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subcommittee which only recently began to consider cloud
computing issues). 56 Even among states in compliance with
the E.U. Data Protection Directive, however, there are
“differing national legal frameworks and uncertainties over
applicable law.” 57 As such, the European Commission’s vice
president, Neelie Kroes, is leading the effort to devise a
standardized set of laws and regulations that can be applied
to cloud computing across the European Union. 58
While there are a great number of politicians and
regulatory bodies with an interest in cloud computing, the
European Commission and the Congressional Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet are
the two most likely to play a major role in the future
regulatory and legal framework.
D. The Legal and Regulatory Climate in the United States
and European Union
There are two primary models for dealing with privacy
and security issues: piecemeal regulation issue by issue, 59 and
attempts to regulate cloud computing directly. 60 The first
approach represents the United States’ current model where
the second represents the approach the European Union is
moving towards. Rather than the standard voluntary uptake
for E.U. regulations, the new European Union data law will
require compliance by all member states and firms acting
within the region. 61 A one hundred and nineteen page
56. See Press Release, Eurpora, Digital Agenda: New strategy to drive
European business and government productivity via cloud computing (Sept. 27,
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1025_en.htm.
57. EUROPEAN COMM’N, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF CLOUD
COMPUTING IN EUROPE 5 (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0529:FIN:EN:PDF.
58. See Barb Darrow, Europe Cloud Plan Addresses Data Protection
Problem. Sort of., GIGAOM (Sept. 27, 2012), http://gigaom.com/cloud/ec-cloudplan-addresses-data-protection-problem-sort-of/.
59. See generally, Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the
Morning—Professional Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 111 (2011) (the author differentiates among issues
stemming from cloud computing systems and evaluates them separately).
60. See, e.g., New Draft European Data Protection Regime, LAW PATENT
GRP. (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.mlawgroup.de/news/publications/detail.php?
we_objectID=227 (describing the new European approach to data protection in
the cloud).
61. See Tom Espiner, Firms Face Tough New EU Fines for Data Breaches,
ZDNET (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/firms-face-tough-new-eu-fines-for-
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document details the layout of the coming legislation. 62 The
European Union’s data law seeks to achieve easier data
portability between service providers, a single set of rules
across borders, and the requirement that personal data
handled by foreign companies be subject to the same
regulations. 63 The following subsections will cover most of
the applicable laws and regulations currently applied to cloud
computing in the United States.
1. Applicable Regulatory Frameworks
There are a large number of state and federal laws and
regulations that could be applied to cloud computing. 64
Ignoring various state laws, there are nine widely applicable
sets of regulations, at least six industry-specific guidelines
and requirements, and a variety of international laws with
bearing on U.S. companies just in the data security space. 65
Foremost among these, at least in terms of visibility, are the
Stored Communications Act, 66 the Patriot Act, 67 the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 68 export
regulations overseen by the Departments of Commerce and
State, 69 and consumer protection under the FTC. 70
data-breaches-3040094907/.
62. European Commission Proposal, Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2012/0011 (COD) (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012
_11_en.pdf [hereinafter European Commission Proposal].
63. See Press Release, Eurpora, Commission proposes a comprehensive
reform of data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut
costs for businesses (Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-1246_en.htm?locale=en.
64. See Jason Bloomberg, Cloud Computing: Legal Quagmire, ZAPTHINK
(Jul. 5, 2011), http://www.zapthink.com/2011/07/05/cloud-computing-legalquagmire/.
65. The Security Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Directory, CSO
SECURITY & RISK (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.csoonline.com/article/632218/thesecurity-laws-regulations-and-guidelines-directory.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
67. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20
U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.) (2001).
68. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
69. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (2011).
70. For a tabulation of cloud computing security laws, regulations, and
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The Stored Communications Act (SCA) is rooted in the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). 71 In
determining whether a particular type of computer network
usage falls under the SCA, the data must be either an
electronic
communication
service
(handling
data
transmissions and electronic mail) or a remote computing
service (providing outsourced computer processing and data
storage). 72 The significance of this distinction is that the
protection afforded to stored data (RCS) is lower than the
protection afforded to the transmitting data (ECS). 73
Different courts do not have a consensus as to categorizing
these services. 74 In Quon v. Arch Wireless, 75 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that because the back-up of text messages was
incidental to the provision of the messaging service, they
would be classified as an ECS. 76 The holding in the Theofel v.
Farey-Jones 77 case, also from the Ninth Circuit, illustrates
that the boundary between RCS and ECS is essentially
arbitrary; holding that even indefinite e-mail backup storage
constitutes an ECS service provision. 78 For the purposes of
this Comment, the exact line drawn between RCS and ECS is
less important than the fact that the “ECPA has been
outpaced” by technological progress. 79 What is important is
that this antiquated statute, written in 1986, is an
exceedingly poor fit for today’s technology and woefully
inadequate going forward.
Another visible concern for the cloud computing industry
is the U.S. Patriot Act. 80 The data security implication of the
guidelines as of 2012 see The Security Laws, Regulations and Guidelines
Directory, supra note 65.
71. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, EFF (Oct. 21, 2005),
http://ilt.eff.org/index.php/Category:ECPA.
72. William Jeremy Robinson, Note, Free at What Cost? Cloud Computing
Privacy under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1205 (2010).
73. See Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Control: Copyright,
Global Memes and Privacy, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 53, 84 (2012).
74. See id. at 87.
75. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d
and rem’d sub. nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
76. Id. at 901.
77. Theofel v. Farely-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).
78. Id.
79. ECPA
Reform:
Why
Now?,
DIGITAL
DUE
PROCESS,
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
80. See David Saleh Rauf, PATRIOT Act Clouds Picture for Tech, POLITICO
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Patriot Act is that companies can be forced to turn over data
to the U.S. government, even without notice to the
customer. 81 Furthermore, even data stored outside U.S.
borders, if held in servers owned by a U.S. company, can
potentially be compromised. 82 The Patriot Act is so powerful
that even contract provisions specifying that data will be
governed by foreign law can be ignored by the U.S.
government. 83 Specifically, section 215 of the Patriot Act
allows the FBI to access data related to investigations in an
ex parte proceeding with the requirement that “no person
shall disclose to any other person . . . that the [FBI] has
The
sought or obtained things under this section.” 84
ramifications of the Patriot Act are directly pressing for
consumers, and thereby concerning to providers looking to
increase uptake.
One statute that is familiar to most is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
HIPPA provides standards that must be followed for
The act
companies dealing with health information. 85
requires that most people who maintain or transmit “health
information shall maintain reasonable and appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.” 86 The
responsibilities to comply with obligations, such as HIPAA,
pose another major burden because customers cannot avoid
liability simply by delegating information technology to a
cloud vendor. 87 Thus, a need exists for detailed contracting to
In the absence of such a
apportion indemnification. 88
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69366.html.
81. Amar Toor, Microsoft: European Cloud Data May Not be Immune to the
Patriot Act, ENGAGET (Jun. 30, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/30/
microsoft-european-cloud-data-may-not-be-immune-to-the-patriot/.
82. Amar Toor, Microsoft’s Patriot Act Admission Has the EU Up in Arms,
ENGAGET (Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/07/06/microsofts-patriotact-admission-has-the-eu-up-in-arms/.
83. Zack Whittaker, Case Study: How the USA Patriot Act Can be used to
access EU Data, ZDNET (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/igeneration/
case-study-how-the-usa-patriot-act-can-be-used-to-access-eu-data/8805.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1).
85. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2).
87. See H. Ward Classen, Cloudy with a Chance of Rain: Avoiding Pitfalls in
Cloud Computing, 45 MD. B. J. 18, 23 (2012).
88. See id.
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contract, the customer may suffer for a data breach that is
the fault of the provider. 89 Due to the lack of industry
certifications that would establish this reasonable standard,
even thorough contracting cannot entirely ensure that there
will not be “a number of people with access to the physical
servers and storage” and “end-to-end” encryption. 90 HIPAA
violations can be severe with penalties including hefty fines
and imprisonment. 91 The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act sets out punishment
ranging from $100 fines for violations deemed accidental to as
much as $50,000 for each instance of a breach due to willful
neglect. 92 Additionally, attorneys’ fees and other costs may
now be sought. 93
In addition to HIPAA’s regulations based on the personal
privacy of information, the Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS) regulates based on the content of the information
transmitted in the cloud. 94 The BIS has assured cloud
providers that they do not need to obtain export licenses for
foreign information technology for clients who utilize their
services, at least when the provider is not transmitting data
to the user. 95 There is, however, less guidance regarding how
the Department of Commerce would handle a U.S. company
uploading controlled information. 96 The BIS’ regulations,
detailed in the Export Administration Regulations, 97 define
controlled information as content related to nuclear
materials
facilities
and
equipment,
chemicals,
microorganisms, toxins, materials processing, electronics,
89. See id.
90. Chris Witt, HIPAA vs the Cloud, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hipaa-vs-cloud.
91. HIPAA and the HITECH Act: Know the Level of Penalties, HC PRO (Mar.
16, 2009), http://www.hcpro.com/HIM-229707-866/HIPAA-and-the-HITECHAct-Know-the-level-of-penalties.html.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 15 C.F.R. § 732.2 (2011).
95. Letter from C. Randall Pratt, Director, Info. Tech. Controls Div., to
redacted recipient (Jan. 11, 2011).
96. See Chad Breckinridge, From the Experts: Cloud Computing’s Hidden
Export Regulation Risks, CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 27, 2012), http://
www.wiltshiregrannis.com/siteFiles/News/6277E4F5146A461D9AFB1782C6E0
C9E1.pdf.
97. Export Administration Regulation Downloadable Files, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/ear/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2014).
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computers, telecommunications, information security, sensors
and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, and aerospace
and propulsion. 98 The clearest example is saving technical
plans to cloud storage where the storage center happens to be
overseas; due to strict liability under EAR, the company could
be subject to a $250,000 penalty per instance. 99 One cloud
service provider (specifically virtualization software),
VMware, is aware of the risks of export/re-export laws and
regulations and has published an Export Control Policy,
warning potential customers about the applicable
regulations. 100 The combined lack of guidance and industry
caution further limits the uptake of cloud computing.
Another possible source of regulatory oversight comes
from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 101 A “security
researcher” filed a complaint with the FTC regarding
allegedly false claims about data protection. 102 The complaint
alleged both that Dropbox, an online data storage solution,
did not utilize industry best practices and that they made
deceptive statements about the level of protection offered. 103
As of yet, there have been no further proceedings in the
Dropbox case, leaving the FTC’s desire to exercise authority
in these situations unclear.
2. European Union Safe Harbor
Compliance with the safe harbor regulations is one of the
only feasible ways United States cloud providers are
currently able to compete in the European market. 104 These
regulations were developed between the United States and

98. Id.
99. Breckinridge, supra note 96.
100. Export Control Policy, VMWARE, http://www.vmware.com/help/exportcontrol.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
102. INFOSEC ISLAND, Dropbox Responds to FTC Complaint about Data
Security (May 18, 2011), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/13848-DropboxResponds-to-FTC-Complaint-about-Data-Security.html.
103. Request for Investigation and Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, In
the Matter of Dropbox, Inc. (FTC, May 11, 2011), available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/05/dropbox-ftc-complaintfinal.pdf.
104. See Patrick Van Eecke, Cloud Computing Legal Issues, DLA PIPER,
http://www.isaca.org/Groups/Professional-English/cloudcomputing/GroupDocuments/DLA_Cloud%20computing%20legal%20issues.pdf
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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European Union to “provide a streamlined means for U.S.
organizations to comply with the Directive.” 105 Among the
terms of the Safe Harbor provisions are standards for the
legitimate use of data, as well as for both the security and
safety of data. 106 While these standards are technically selfadministered, the FTC has stepped in under the umbrella of
deceptive trade practices when U.S. companies fall short on
their promises to their customers to comply with safe harbor
standards. 107 If and when the proposed European Union
framework for data security comes into effect, those reforms
will essentially replace the Safe Harbor regulations and force
U.S. companies to be certified under E.U. law—the exact
specifications of which are currently unknown. 108 Regardless,
the standards would not prevent privacy intrusions under the
Patriot Act for companies owned or operating in the United
States. 109
E. Torts and State Law in the Cloud
In addition to formal regulatory frameworks, providers
also face regulation from state laws and general tort
principles. 110 The case of Wong et. al. v. Dropbox, Inc., 111 is
illustrative of possible state and tort principles faced by cloud
providers: (1) Violation of the California Unfair Competition
Law, Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq., (2)
Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion, Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, Misappropriation of Likeness and Identity, and
105. Welcome to the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp.
106. Zack Whittaker, Safe Harbor: Why EU Data Needs ‘Protecting’ from US
Law, ZDNET (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/igeneration/safeharbor-why-eu-data-needs-protecting-from-us-law/8801.
107. See Anita Ramasastry, The EU-US Safe Harbor Does Not Protect US
Companies with Unsafe Privacy Practices, FIND LAW (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20091117.html.
108. Zack Whittaker, European Data Protection Law Proposals Revealed,
ZDNET (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/european-dataprotection-law-proposals-revealed/1365.
109. See Peter Cartier, USA Patriot Act and Cloud Hosting: What You Need
to Know, FPWEB.NET (Jan. 16, 2012), http://blog.fpweb.net/usa-patriot-act-cloudhosting/.
110. See, e.g., James R. Hood, Cloud Site Dropbox Drops the Ball,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS (June 27, 2011), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/
2011/06/cloud-site-dropbox-drops-the-ball.html.
111. Class Action Complaint, Wong v. DropBox, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-03092 (N.D.
Cal. 2011), 2011 WL 9162340.
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California Constitutional Right to Privacy, (3) Negligence, (4)
Breach of Express Warranty, and (5) Breach of Implied
Warranty. 112 The action against Dropbox arose out of an
update that inadvertently allowed anyone to log into any
account using any password. This security breach lasted
approximately four hours. 113 In other data breach cases, the
average award per plaintiff upon settlement was $2,500. 114
That means that in cases such as the 2011 PlayStation
Network breach, where Sony lost approximately $171 million
directly from the breach, companies also risk losing (through
settlement or litigation) an additional $2,500 for each of their
potentially millions of customers. 115 Although many cases are
dismissed for failure to prove actual damages, 116 in at least
one case of stolen electronic payment data, the court allowed
mitigation damages for credit card replacement costs and
credit insurance. 117
F. Fourth Amendment and the Cloud
Another source of legal complexity is the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment to cloud computing. The Fourth
Amendment protects the right for people “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 118 Supreme Court jurisprudence in
the area is dominated by the test from Katz v. United
112. Id. at *1.
113. Matthew Humphries, Dropbox Facing Class Action Lawsuit over “any
password worked” Glitch, GEEK (Jun. 28, 2011), http://www.geek.com/
articles/geek-pick/dropbox-facing-class-action-lawsuit-over-any-passwordworked-glitch-20110628/.
114. Data Breach Costs Skyrocket as Class-Action Lawsuits become More
Prevalent, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/view/29022/data-breach-costs-skyrocket-as-classaction-lawsuitsbecome-more-prevalent/.
115. Sony Data Breach Lawsuit Largely Dismissed, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Oct.
23, 2012), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/28945/sony-data-breachlawsuit-largely-dismissed.
116. David Navetta, Federal Appeals Court Holds Identity Theft
Insurance/Credit Monitoring Costs Constitute “Damages” in Hannaford Breach
Case, INFO. LAW GRP. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2011/10/
articles/damages/federal-appeals-court-holds-identity-theft-insurancecreditmonitoring-costs-constitute-damages-in-hannaford-breach-case/.
117. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 162–68 (1st Cir. 2011)
(holding that, when confidential data is stolen by a third party the customers of
a grocery, there is no confidential relationship but that there is a possibility of
mitigation damages under negligence and implied contract theories).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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States. 119 In Katz, the Court recognized that people have a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” 120 when two conditions are
met: “ First that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’ ” 121 The impact of the Fourth Amendment in
cloud computing circumstances is unclear, as detailed
below. 122
II. THE SOCIETAL IMPORTANCE OF CLOUD COMPUTING
Cloud computing technologies represent a paradigm shift
for both individuals and corporations. 123 These services take
advantage of the principles of economies of scale and
specialization to provide a more efficient solution for many
information technology problems. 124 As in all situations,
consumers on both the corporate and personal level will
balance the risk with the reward of utilizing the new set of
technologies.
The primary risks are confusion as to
applicable laws, the changing regulatory climate, and lack of
While these risks can be quite
industry standards. 125
significant depending on the profile of the consumer, there
are a plethora of reasons why both corporations and
individuals consider switching to the cloud. The problem is
that despite the many benefits of cloud computing, the
technology and society’s benefit are being limited by the
current legal structure.
The primary reason a corporation would be interested in
utilizing cloud technology is that they no longer are
responsible for maintaining their own information technology
structure and can focus on their core competencies. 126 A close
second in primacy is that the scalability of cloud computing
119. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 361.
122. See infra Part I.F.
123. See Cloud Computing Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Mr. Smith).
124. See Ryan Nichols, Cloud Computing by the Numbers: What do
All the Statistics Mean?, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 31, 2010), http://
blogs.computerworld.com/16863/cloud_computing_by_the_numbers_what_do_all
_the_statistics_mean.
125. See infra Part II.
126. See Janakiram MSV, Top 10 Reasons Why Startups Should Consider
Cloud Computing, YOUR STORY (Jul. 20, 2012), http://cloudstory.in/2012/07/top10-reasons-why-startups-should-consider-cloud/.
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allows companies to only pay for computing power when they
actually need it. 127 That is, instead of having a large server
farm running all of the time, even in low traffic periods,
companies pay as needed on a virtually instantaneous
basis. 128 Various analysts suggest that the market for cloud
computing will grow rapidly. 129 In fact, current estimates
from Forrester state that the market will reach two hundred
and forty one billion dollars by the year 2020. 130 This is in
large part due to the fact that estimates suggest savings due
to virtualization can “[cut] the cost of computing by up to 50
percent with savings gains from lower infrastructure
At the moment, however, many
operational costs.” 131
enterprises only look to cloud computing when “deploying
new, non-mission-critical apps or apps not containing
sensitive data.” 132 These mission critical or highly sensitive
applications are also those subject to the highest levels of
investment, meaning that they have the largest margin for
improvements in efficiency. 133
There are, of course, also non-legal risks associated with
utilizing cloud computing. 134 Some of the more threatening
aspects of cloud computing implementation are the large
attack surface, 135 shared multi-tenant environments, 136 loss of
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Cloud Computing Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Mr. Smith).
Id.
Nichols, supra note 124.
Rick Blaisdell, Cloud Computing Market Size—Facts and Trends,
CLOUDTWEAKS (Jul. 7, 2012), http://www.cloudtweaks.com/2012/07/cloudcomputing-market-size-facts-and-trends/.
131. See Cloud Computing Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Mr. Castro).
132. Derrick Harris, It’s Cloud Prediction Time: IDC, Gartner (and I) Weigh
in, GIGAOM (Dec. 1, 2011), http://gigaom.com/cloud/its-cloud-prediction-time-idcgartner-and-i-weigh-in/.
133. See Archana Venkatraman, CIOs Distrust Public Cloud for MissionCritical Work, Says IDC, COMPUTER WEEKLY (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240170818/CIOs-distrust-public-cloudfor-mission-critical-work-says-IDC.
134. See, e.g., Cloudy With a Chance of Rain, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15640793 (“What is holding IT managers back
is fear about security.”).
135. See PRATYUSA K. MANADHATA, YUECEL KARABULUT & JEANNETTE
WING, CARNEGIE MELON UNIV., REPORT: MEASURING THE ATTACK SURFACES OF
ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE 3 (2008), available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~wing/
publications/ManadhataKarabulutWing08.pdf.
The authors define attack
surface in terms of the number of entry and exit points of data, the number of
channels and set of untrusted data times (terms also defined in the article). Id.
136. JUNIPER NETWORKS, SECURING MULTI-TENANCY AND CLOUD
COMPUTING 3 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/
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control over data, and Internet-facing clients. 137 Aside from
the technical problems companies face, there is awareness in
the industry that certain regulatory mandates can pose risks
for failure to properly secure data. 138
In fact, at this point, it seems that decision makers are
not seeing the value in cloud computing. According to some
analysts, the attitude regarding cloud computing is heading
from hype to disillusionment. 139 One IBM survey suggests
that “only 13% of businesses have substantially implemented
any cloud based services.” 140 Nevertheless, other analysts
predict that between 2011 and 2014, as a percentage of total
applications used by corporations, cloud computing will
double in Europe and go up by roughly seventy nine percent
in the United States and Asia. 141 The European Union
already has a more predictable set of regulations, yet IDC
predicts that further policy driven change could greatly
increase adoption going forward. 142 The perception at the
moment is that contracts tend to favor service providers, and
that it is impractical (if not essentially impossible) to verify if
the contracted-for security precautions have in fact been
provided until after a breach occurs. 143
whitepapers/2000381-en.pdf. The authors define multi-tenancy as a system
where many tenants share the same resources such as hardware, servers, data
storage devices, and even applications. Id.
137. See WAYNE JANSEN & TIMOTHY GRACE, GUIDELINES ON SECURITY AND
PRIVACY IN PUBLIC CLOUD COMPUTING vii–viii (Dec. 2011), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-144/SP800-144.pdf.
138. See Cloudy With a Chance of Rain, supra note 134.
139. See Derek du Preez, Gartner: Cloud Uptake Lower than Expected,
COMPUTERWORLDUK (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/itbusiness/3376477/gartner-cloud-uptake-lower-than-expected/.
140. IBM Find Businesses Slow on Uptake of Cloud Computing, IBSI
IN[N]OVATIVE BUS. SYS. (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.ibsi-us.com/2012/04/ibm-findbusinesses-slow-on-uptake-of-cloud-computing/#comments.
141. The State of Adoption of Cloud Applications, TATA CONSULTANCY
SERVS.,
http://sites.tcs.com/cloudstudy/the-state-of-adoption-of-cloudapplications#.UI2frHf9cz5 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
142. DAVID BRADSHAW ET AL., QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE
DEMAND FOR CLOUD COMPUTING IN EUROPE AND THE LIKELY BARRIERS TO
UP-TAKE 9 (Jul. 13, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/
cloudcomputing/docs/quantitative_estimates.pdf (“[P]olicy actions aimed at
removing barriers to cloud can have a relevant impact on its adoption,
increasing the value of spending on public clouds from €35 billion (No
intervention scenario) to almost €80 billion (Policy-driven scenario) by 2020.”).
143. Gregory Musungu, Treading Carefully with Cloud Computing
Solutions, Contracts, and Services, CLOUDTWEAKS (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.cloudtweaks.com/2012/10/treading-carefully-with-cloud-computing-
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These contractual issues and inability to self-regulate are
magnified when it comes to individual utilization of cloud
computing services. The American public is an odd mix of
highly competent and well informed consumers, with a
significant portion of the population who believe that “cloud
technology is linked with weather, has kinship with heaven,
is closely related to happenings in the outer galaxy and even
has something to do with toilet paper (huh?).” 144 The
knowledge issue is relevant because although about sixty
percent of respondents claimed they had not used cloud
computing services, something closer to ninety five percent
were actually using services with cloud computing
components. 145 This means that a significant portion of the
public is unwittingly exposed to unknown degrees of
liability. 146 While organizations and corporations are advised
to negotiate their own contracts and terms of service, a nonnegotiable service agreement is the standard in publicly
These adhesion contracts
available cloud computing. 147
include clauses such as jurisdictional choice, time limits in
which claims can be brought, and other clauses that severely
limit the rights of those consumers unable to effectively
Regardless, many consumers do choose to
negotiate. 148
assume the risk (or, more likely, remain unaware of said risk)
and use at least some cloud computing services.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Effects of the Regulatory Quagmire
In many respects, the maze of laws and regulations
facing the cloud computing industry, even limited to the topic
of privacy and security, act as a veritable sword of

solutions-contracts-and-services/.
144. Humayun Shahid, Cloud Confusion: The ‘Fluffy White Thing’ and the
Potential Within, CLOUDTWEAKS (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.cloudtweaks.com/
2012/09/cloud-confusion-the-fluffy-white-thing-and-the-potential-within/.
145. Id. Examples of these services given are “online banking, purchasing
goods online, being socially connected, enjoying online games.” Id.
146. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of industry standards.
147. See JANSEN & GRACE, supra note 137, at vii.
148. See Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and
Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, 19 INT’L
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 198–214 (2011).
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Damocles. 149
Each of the following regulatory schemes
(detailed earlier) 150 create their own problems for consumers
and providers wishing to act in the cloud computing space.
The major problem with the Stored Communications Act
is the disagreement regarding which services belong in which
category. 151 The logic of applying the SCA to current cloud
computing is also strained because the original act was based
on the theory that consumers were entrusting their data in
an agency-like relationship, whereas most see cloud
computing as more akin to a rental locker. 152 While more
than a civil subpoena is required to obtain more than basic
subscriber information, 153 information must fall into one of
several categories in order for it to be protected by the
requirement that the government obtain a search warrant. 154
Regardless of any particular court’s decision, the SCA is
outdated. 155 Despite the twenty-five years of inaction, and
support from most of the major players in the industry,156
legislation to update the protection of e-mail and other
electronic data has only recently been introduced. 157 While
149. N.S. Gil, What is the Sword of Damocles?, CLASSICAL HISTORY,
http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/ciceroworkslatin/f/DamoclesSword.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014).
150. See supra Part I.D–F.
151. Compare Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that because the primary service of defendant was
communication provision, the storage of that data was incidental), with Theofel
v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that even though
the ISP’s purpose was not necessarily the sending of data, it still fell within
ECS protection).
152. See Hien Timothy M. Nguyen, Note, Cloud Cover: Privacy Protections
and the Stored Communications Act in the Age of Cloud Computing, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2189, 2205–06 (2011).
153. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559, 561
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
154. Disclosure may be required following a subpoena if the information is
the contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage, contents
of wire or electronic communications in a remote computing service, or records
concerning ECS or RCS. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–(c) (2012).
155. Declan McCullagh, Google, Facebook go Retro in Push to update 1986
Privacy Law, CNET (Oct. 21, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_320123710-281/google-facebook-go-retro-in-push-to-update-1986-privacy-law/.
156. See Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/
index.cfm?objectid=DF652CE0-2552-11DF-B455000C296BA163 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014).
157. See Chris Calabrese, Email Privacy Faces a Key Test Next Week, FREE
FUTURE (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-libertynational-security/email-privacy-faces-key-test-next-week.
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opponents argue that warrant-level protection would hinder
law enforcement efforts, the proposed legislation would go a
long way toward easing the minds of both sides of the cloud
computing market. 158
Aside from SCA protection of electronic data, the Patriot
Act poses the biggest challenge to U.S. companies. 159 Less
important than the actual content of the law, however, is the
uncertainty created by it. This reality leads to “no shortage of
people who misapprehend the law.
If some of these
misperceptions harden or real problems [are] not addressed,
it will cause companies and governments to hesitate in doing
business with U.S. cloud companies.” 160 Specifically, an issue
admittedly more of public relations than legal jurisprudence,
many other countries’ data protection laws “ provide
governments with ‘expedited access’ to Cloud data.” 161 In a
very real sense, however, the Patriot Act undermines much of
the importance of the debate regarding the SCA because,
unlike other laws, it is a legal burden that cannot be
contracted around. 162
While the SCA and Patriot Act create doubt over the
viability of data protection, other regulatory schemes create
other problems. The HIPPA, 163 EAR, 164 and possible FTC
proceedings for deceptive trade practices, 165 all create a
significant risk for both providers and customers of cloud
services leading to higher transaction costs and more
complicated contracts. 166 While there are no outstanding
cases under the EAR code sections, the government has not
yet offered any guidance either way whether they will offer
158. See generally McCullagh, supra note 155 (discussing, among other
things, the lack of bipartisan support and opposition of the U.S. Justice
Department).
159. See Aidan Finn, A Factual Analysis of Cloud Computing VS
the USA Patriot Act, AIDAN FINN, IT PRO BLOG (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.aidanfinn.com/?p=11187 (“[I]f data laws continue to cause concern
then what’s to stop a Chinese operator dominating there, or a
French/UK/German operator dominating in Europe. . . .”).
160. Rauf, supra note 80.
161. Gery Menegaz, Bad Assumptions about Cloud Computing and the
Patriot Act, ZDNET (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/bad-assumptionsabout-cloud-computing-and-the-patriot-act-7000002614/.
162. See Musungu, supra note 143.
163. See supra Part I.D.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
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clarification or begin enforcing EAR strictly. 167 The risk of
being faced with an FTC proceeding is an outstanding issue
that cannot be discounted. Due to the fact that fines and
prosecutions under HIPPA 168 and EAR 169 are strict liability,
complicated contracting and indemnification clauses are
required to apportion liability between cloud providers and
consumers (an option unavailable to the general public).
B. The Effect of Generic Laws on Cloud Computing
While there are many regulations weighing upon the
cloud computing industry, 170 there is also the standard range
of generally applicable laws looming large.
Whether
companies stand to face a relatively minor penalty under tort
principles, as seen in the Hannaford case, 171 or the weightier
risks Sony faces, remain to be seen. 172 Unless the Sony case
is decided in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears likely that data
breaches may follow the Hannaford model, with credit
monitoring and fraud restoration providing an easy to
calculate and relatively affordable compromise. 173 A ruling
for Sony upon the amended complaint seems appropriate, and
their offer of “ free identity theft protection services, certain
free downloads and online services, and ‘[said that it would]
consider’ helping customers who [had] been issued new credit
cards” 174 would fit well with the Hannaford decision. The
167. Breckinridge, supra note 96.
168. See Jeffrey Roman, HIPAA Audits: An Update, HEALTH CARE INFO SEC.
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/hipaa-audits-update-a4607/op-1.
169. See Eric R. McClafferty, Exporting into the Cloud: Export Compliance
Issues Associated with Cloud Computing, INFOTECH SPOTLIGHT (Feb. 2,
2010), http://it.tmcnet.com/topics/it/articles/74329-exporting-into-cloud-exportcompliance-issues-associated-with.htm.
170. See supra Part III.A.
171. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 162–68 (1st Cir.
2011).
172. It remains to be seen whether the Sony plaintiffs will be able to
sufficiently restate a Consolidated Complaint by November 9, 2012. In re Sony
Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, Nos. 11cv2119 &
11cv2120, 2012 WL 4849054 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012).
173. See generally Dian Schaffhauser, U Hawaii Settles Data Breach
Class Action Suit, CAMPUS TECH. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://campustechnology.com/
articles/2012/01/30/u-hawaii-settles-data-breach-class-action-suit.aspx
(“The
University of Hawaii system has settled a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of
96,000 students, faculty, staff, and alumni who were part of five alleged data
breaches at four institutions between 2009 and 2011.”).
174. Venkat Balasubramani, Sony Network Data Breach Class Action Suffers
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prevalence of class-action, tort lawsuits is a symptom of an
industry without well-articulated standards and regulations,
relying on individual judges’ common sense rather than a
cohesive set of principles for governing this complex set of
technologies and unique problems.
The applicability of the Fourth Amendment provides
another platform for litigation. The Supreme Court has
refused to reach the issue of whether individuals have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in digital communications. 175
A number of lower courts have, however, considered this
issue and held that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in non-local data. 176 Specifically, the nature of
modern computing tends to lead to violations of the Fourth
Amendment based on overbroad warrants. 177 The Supreme
Court’s refusal to deal directly with this issue does, however,
leave consumers without the ability to predict whether or not
their data is open to essentially unlimited searches.
C. Industry Standards and Contractual Issues
In light of the variety of problems service providers
face, 178 and the high value of the services they provide, 179
providers often offer what are essentially adhesion contracts
in the form of terms of use agreements. 180 In order to manage
risk and maximize profit, providers seek to control terms such
as when and how data can be accessed, what happens with
Setback – In re Sony Gaming Networks, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Oct. 15,
2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/sony_network_da.htm.
175. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (holding that the
presence of a clause allowing the employer to monitor activity abrogated the
need for Fourth Amendment analysis).
176. See, e.g., State v. Bellar, 217 P. 3d 1094, 1107 (Or. App. Ct. 2009)
(holding that neither storing data on a hard drive or storing that data in a
secure medium owned by a third party destroyed the privacy interest); Crispin
v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010); In re
United States’ Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Elec.
Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d. 1138, 1141 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
177. In re United States’ Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and
Search Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 1144 (“[T]he
sheer volume of ESI involved distinguishes a digital search from the search of,
for example, a file cabinet.”).
178. See supra Part I.
179. See supra Part II.
180. See Mark Taylor, The Basics of Cloud Computing, HOGAN LOVELLS,
http://ehoganlovells.com/rv/ff0001f56ad18fc97abed201ea4aaf4ecab5ac52/p=1
(last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
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that data upon contract termination, what remedies are
available, what notice must be given for price changes,
flexibility of service provision, and ease of contract
termination. 181 Most important from the legal standpoint
however, and of greatest importance when negotiations do
occur, are clauses dealing with “security, liability and
indemnities.” 182
The common primary documents (sometimes combined)
in cloud computing contracting are Terms of Services, Service
Level Agreements, the Acceptable Use Policy, and the Privacy
Policy. 183 Standard service packages include terms that could
easily catch users who are unfamiliar with the services offguard. 184 For instance, in a study of thirty-one terms and
conditions packets presented to customers in the United
Kingdom, fifteen specified a state in the United States for the
choice of law provision. 185 Furthermore, regarding use of the
cloud-hosted data, many major providers reserve a great
degree of discretion for handling consumer data. 186 One such
clause provides for broad discretion for the provider to refuse
service, terminate accounts or alter hosted content. 187 Apple’s
iCloud service also contains a similar clause, giving the
provider the discretion to “pre-screen, move, refuse, modify
and/or remove Content at any time, without prior notice and
in its sole discretion . . .” 188 Despite the plethora of providers
offering completely one-sided terms of service, some do take
181. See id.
182. Peter M. Lefkowitz, Contracting in the Cloud: A Primer, 54 B. B. J. 9, 10
(2010).
183. Bradshaw et al., supra note 148, at 192 (Providing the following
definitions: ToS as the document detailing the overall relationship including
commercial terms, choice of law, and disclaimers; SLA as a document specifying
the level of service the provider will deliver and process for compensation; AUP
as permitted and forbidden uses of the service; and Privacy Policy as a
document describing the provider’s approach to using and protecting customer’s
personal information including data protection.).
184. See Derek Constantine, Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological
Innovation, The Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499,
501 (2012).
185. Bradshaw et al., supra note 148, at 199.
186. Id. at 203.
187. AWS Site Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (Dec. 23, 2011),
http://aws.amazon.com/terms (stating that, among other things, Amazon
“reserves the right to . . . remove or edit content in its sole discretion.”).
188. iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE (Sept. 18, 2013), http://
http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/terms.html.
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into consideration the needs of their clients. 189
The
combination of highly varied terms of service agreements
among competitors, frequent unilateral changes to the terms,
and the tendency of consumers to forego reading the terms at
all, create further problems. 190
Another major point of concern for consumers,
particularly ones subject to privacy regulations such as
HIPPA, is the broad range of data disclosure policies. 191 On
one hand, some companies require a court order and assist
customers in opposing orders to turn over information. 192 On
the other side of the spectrum, Facebook is willing to turn
over information to “other companies, lawyers, courts or other
government entities” in order to “protect ourselves . . .” 193
These terms are not subject to negotiation in the vast
majority of cases.
In addition to problems with terms of service and service
provision, there are no industry standards for the treatment
of data or security measures. A variety of entities including
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 194 the
and
the
International
Cloud
Security
Alliance, 195
Organization for Standardization 196 offer security guidelines,
but none of these standards have been uniformly (or even
widely) adopted. 197 Although in 2009 several companies such
189. E.g., AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (Mar. 15,
2012), http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (“You may specify the AWS regions in
which Your Content will be stored and accessible by End Users. We will not
move Your Content from your selected AWS regions without notifying you,
unless required to comply with the law or requests of governmental entities.”).
190. See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 540–65 (2008)
(analyzing, among other things, how many users actually read privacy policy, to
what extent, and at what speed).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-9(a) (2012).
192. Master Subscription Agreement, SALESFORCE ¶ 8.3 (Nov. 27, 2013),
https://www.salesforce.com/assets/pdf/misc/salesforce_MSA.pdf.
193. How Does Facebook Work with Law Enforcement, FACEBOOK (Aug.
2013), https://www.facebook.com/help/131535283590645.
194. Information Technology Portal, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH (Feb.
13, 2014). http://www.nist.gov/information-technology-portal.cfm.
195. CLOUD SEC. ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014).
196. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, www.iso.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2014).
197. See Christine Lyon & Karin Retzer, Privacy in the Cloud: A Legal
Framework for Moving Personal Data to the Cloud, CORP. COUNSELOR, Feb. 14,
2011, at 3.
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as IBM, CISCO and SAP called for better security and
monitoring industry standards in the cloud, Amazon.com,
Google, and Microsoft refused to join them. 198 The sheer
numbers of purported standards suggest that there is no
pending consensus in this area. 199
The lack of these
standards increases the importance of contract negotiation
and due diligence considering the array of liabilities
consumers can be exposed to.
IV. PROPOSAL
The European Union is on the right track with the idea
to decrease uncertainty by publishing standards and clearing
up the regulatory framework. 200 The danger of this confusion
is borne out by the less favorable outlook on cloud computing
among United States companies relative to European
That Congress is just, as of June 2012,
entities. 201
contemplating both the future regulations and the
applicability of various existing and potential laws does not
bode well for the stability of the cloud computing market.
There is a need for quick action or at least clear
communication
between
legislators,
the
judiciary,
prosecutors, and players in the cloud computing industry.
This action could come in the form of new legislation,
regulations, or a clear choice to abstain from directly
regulating cloud computing. What is mandatory, for the
potential of cloud computing to be fully realized, is some clear
direction given from the entities most capable of destabilizing
the industry.
From the standpoint of risk analysis, the content of the
recommendation is less important than having direction
(regardless of what that direction may be). However, during
their inquiries into the demands of data protection in the age
of cloud computing, the European Economic Commission
198. David Binning, Top Five Cloud Computing Security Issues, COMPUTER
WEEKLY (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240089111/
Top-five-cloud-computing-security-issues.
199. Welcome To The Cloud Standards Wiki, CLOUD-STANDARD.ORG (May 13,
2013), http://cloud-standards.org/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014).
200. See Ron Tolido, Cloud Uncertainty is the Enemy of Investment,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fd41369a-fde611e1-9901-00144feabdc0.html.
201. See The State of Adoption of Cloud Applications, supra note 141.
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discovered that “economic stakeholders . . . asked for
increased legal certainty and harmonization of the rules on
In line with this
the protection of personal data.” 202
sentiment, sure to be similar among U.S. stakeholders, there
should be a solitary body of law and clear set of guidelines
regarding applicability of other regulations. For instance,
rather than having one set of privacy standards under HIPPA
(health care information) and another under Payment Card
Industry compliance standards (technical and operational
requirements that apply to all organizations that process or
transmit cardholder data), 203 there should be one uniform set
of standards and requirements acceptable for both
applications.
A uniform set of laws governing data privacy and
security would be beneficial in several respects. For example,
service providers’ ability to more accurately assess their risk
would decrease the need for them to push their risk onto
consumers through contracts that force the customer to deal
with privacy breaches that are the fault of the provider. 204
While service contract prices may rise in the short term, the
focus on price competition rather than competition based on
Terms of Service agreements would provide a platform for
greater investment and stability over time. Not only would
this assist U.S. companies, it would help to lead to further
international harmonization and further increase certainty.205
In addition to consolidating existing federal regulatory
schemes, it may be wise for the FTC or another regulatory
body to preempt state laws dealing with cloud computing.
Although this may not be an entirely popular move, it would
202. European Commission Proposal, supra note 62.
203. See generally PCI DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, PCI SEC.
STANDARDS COUNCIL (Oct. 2010), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf.
204. For a discussion of a variety of anti-consumer contractual clauses, see
David Navetta, Cyber Insurance: An Efficient Way to Manage Security and
Privacy Risk in the Cloud?, INFO. LAW GRP. (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2012/02/articles/cloud-computing-1/cyberinsurance-an-efficient-way-to-manage-security-and-privacy-risk-in-the-cloud/
205. See Vineeth Narayanan, Note, Harnessing the Cloud: International Law
Implications of Cloud-Computing, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 783, 808 (2012) (“ The
second equilibrium state is one in which countries work together, through an
agreement or international organization, to design a common set of data
protection laws or to minimize jurisdictional clashes by essentially divvying up
the ‘cloud.’ ”).
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prevent these cloud companies from facing a torrent of
different standards arising out of individually constructed
state consumer protection laws.
CONCLUSION
Participants in the cloud computing market face
difficulty both when predicting the future value of present
infrastructure and technology investments due to regulatory
uncertainty, 206 and when predicting liability costs under the
current legal framework. Assuming that many, if not most,
managers and directors are at least mildly risk-averse, the
perceived cost of participating in the cloud computing market
is not close to its optimal value. 207 Current market conditions
are suppressed, and future investment in technology is
limited because of the risk that any investment in security or
certain other types of infrastructure could very easily be
incompatible with future regulatory changes.
The surest path towards certainty would be for the
United States to follow the lead of the European Union. 208 A
unified code system would improve the ability of managers to
evaluate their assets, liabilities, and future investments. 209
Although the political economics of regulating major
industries is delicate, incremental improvement is mandatory
if cloud computing is to reach its full potential. 210 Regardless
of whether the U.S. government chooses to regulate heavily or
to allow the cloud computing industry to develop in a more
unfettered manner, there needs to be clarity and certainty
regarding rights, liabilities, and future regulations—
conditions glaringly absent at present.
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See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.

